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1. INTRODUCTION
On a per capita basis, American firms produce the majority of the
world's intellectual property capital (i.e., patents, copyrights, and trade
secrets).' Approximately 70 percent of the market value of U.S. firms
resides in their trade secrets and other intellectual property.2 Unfortunately,
many firms spend insufficient sums of money to protect such property,
making them vulnerable to intellectual property espionage. 3 These vital
assets have become the target of increased attacks by current and former
employees, competitors, on-site contractors, professional spies, hackers,
vendors, business intelligence consultants, and foreign governments.
4
Precise figures on the amount of trade secret espionage that occurs are
not readily available. One study by PricewaterhouseCoopers, sponsored by
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the American Society for Industrial
Security, estimates that theft of intellectual property (including trade
secrets), costs American firms about $59 billion per year.5 The National
Counterintelligence Executive claims economic espionage could cost the
nation's business community up to $250 billion per year once lost sales are
taken into account. 6 Another estimate places annual losses from economic
espionage to be between $130 and $330 billion.
7
Trade secret espionage is practiced by both private firms and foreign
governments. 8 Approximately 85 percent of trade secret piracy involves
current or former employees. 9 The remainder involves foreign countries
I HEDIAH NASHERI, ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE AND INDUSTRIAL SPYING, (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2005).
2 William M. Fitzpatrick, Samuel A. DiLullo, & Donald R. Burke, Trade Secret Piracy
and Protection: Corporate Espionage, Corporate Security and the Law, 12 ADVANCES IN
COMPETITIVENESS RESEARCH 57, 57 (2004).
3 Id. at 58.
4 Id.
5 Pricewaterhouse Coopers, U.S. Chamber of Commerce and American Society for
Industrial Security, Trends in Proprietary Information Loss Survey Report (2002) available
at http://www.asisonline.org/newsroom/pressReleases/093002trends.xml.
6 The Enemy Within, ENGINEER, August 9, 2002.
7 Richard Krantz, Industrial Espionage Becomes Favorite Way to Achieve Gains,
VOICE OF AM., Apr. 29, 2005, available at http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2005-
04/2005-04-29-voa I.cfm (last visited Jan. 8, 2010).
8 See id. Technically, "economic espionage" refers to the theft of intellectual property
assets by a foreign government or an agent of a foreign government. "Industrial espionage or
spying" refers to such activity when perpetrated by a domestic or foreign firm or business.
We use the term "trade secret espionage" to include the theft or misappropriation of a trade
secret by either a foreign government or private firm or individual. Id.
9 Glenna Rodgers & Scott Marrs, Protecting Your Company's Crown Jewels: What
Every Corporate Counsel Should Know About Trade Secrets and Corporate Espionage, IP
LITIGATOR, Mar./Apr., 2005, at 21.
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that allegedly commit trade secret piracy against American firms. Such
countries purportedly include France, Israel, Russia, China, Iran, Cuba, the
Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Japan, Canada, India, and several
Scandinavian countries. 
10
Industries commonly targeted by espionage efforts are aerospace,
pharmaceutical, defense, computer/electronics, telecommunications, energy
research, financial services, manufacturing processes, and semiconduct-
ors.1I1 The information typically sought out by trade secret pirates include
customer lists, design manuals and drawings, financial data, food and
dessert recipes, product development data, strategic planning information,
manufacturing cost data, formulas, testing data, marketing strategies,
installation techniques, product composition, and clustering technology.12
The increase in trade secret espionage activity presents an opportunity
for the legal and accounting professions, along with the business
community to curb the tide of this growing financial crime. Indeed, it
behooves such professionals and the business community to acquire a basic
familiarity with the legal and non-legal methods to prevent trade secret
espionage.
The purposes of this article are to provide an overview of trade secret
law, 13 an analysis of reasonable steps to preserve secrecy, an assessment of
independent economic value (of trade secrets), an evaluation of
misappropriation of trade secrets (including an outline of espionage
techniques), an analysis of available legal remedies, a compendium of
defenses to liability, and an outline of internal controls to protect an entity's
trade secrets.
10 Chris Carr & Larry Gorman, The Revictimization of Companies by the Stock Market
Who Report Trade Secret Theft Under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 57 Bus. LAW.
25, 27 (2001).
1 Chris Carr, Jack Morton & Jerry Furniss, The Economic Espionage Act: Bear Trap or
Mousetrap? 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 159, 162 (2000).
12 See Gary S. Gaffney & Maria E. Ellison, A Primer on Florida Trade Secret Law:
Unlocking the "Secrets" to "Trade Secret"' Litigation, I I U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 1 (2003).
13 The primary means of enforcement available to victims of trade secret piracy is a civil
lawsuit filed under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (U.T.S.A.) or state trade secret common
law. In a civil suit for damages, a claimant must prove: (1) the existence of a trade secret; (2)
reasonable steps to preserve secrecy; (3) independent economic value of the trade secret; (4)
misappropriation; and (5) actual loss caused by the misappropriation. 18 U.S.C. §§ 183 1-
1839 (2006) (Another mode of enforcement, in some cases, is a criminal action brought by
the Department of Justice under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996).
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11. DEFINITION OF A TRADE SECRET
A trade secret encompasses any information that has value because it
is not generally known. 14 A trade secret must contain some element not
generally known which sets it apart from that which is generally known.
1 5
Furthermore, trade secret protection does not require that every component
of the information in question be completely confidential. 16
Two or more definitions of "trade secret" exist in the law. Since trade
secret protection is primarily addressed by state law, the definition in the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (U.T.S.A.) (currently adopted by 45 states, the
District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) is most instructive:'
7
A trade secret is information including a formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process
that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use and (ii) is the subject
of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain
its secrecy. 18
The U.T.S.A. does not require that a trade secret be used continuously in
business; a secret that has not yet been put to use still may be protected.19
In the states that have not adopted the U.T.S.A., a definition of a trade
secret is set forth in the Restatement (First) of Torts (Restatement):
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device, or
compilation of information which is used in one's business, and
which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over
competitors who do not know how to use it. It may be a formula
for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating
or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device,
14 Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets? I I MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 8
(2007).
15 See STEPHEN B. FINK, STICKY FINGERS: MANAGING THE GLOBAL RISK OF ECONOMIC
ESPIONAGE 212 (Dearborn Trade Press 2002).
16 See id.
17 Wikipedia, Uniform Trade Secrets Act, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
UniformTradeSecretsAct (last visited Jan. 25, 2009).
18 U.T.S.A. § 1(4)(1985).
19 Risch, supra note 14, at 48.
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or a list of customers ... A trade secret is a process or device for
continuous use in the operation of the business.
20
Key differences between the two definitions "are (a) the exception for
'single use' information, which can be a trade secret under the U.T.S.A.; (b)
the requirement of continuous use in business, which is not necessary under
the U.T.S.A.; and (c) less emphasis on efforts to maintain secrecy than
under the U.T.S.A.' In sum, the Restatement provides a narrower
definition of a trade secret than the U.T.S.A. because it focuses upon
business processes and practices actually used by a firm rather than
information that could bring economic benefit to a company.
22
Another definition of "trade secret" is found in the Economic
Espionage Act of 1996 (E.E.A.). 23 This law is a federal statute that
criminalizes the theft of trade secrets by industrial spies and foreign
governments. However, the law does not recognize a private cause of action
for trade secret piracy.2 4 Under this statute, the term "trade secret" includes
... all forms and types of financial, business, scientific,
technical, economic, or engineering information, including
patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas,
designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures,
or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how
stored, compiled or memorialized physically, electronically,
graphically, or in writing... 25
There are also differences between the language of the E.E.A. and
U.T.S.A. First, the list of potential types of secrets is more expansive in the
E.E.A. than in the U.T.S.A. For example, the language of § 1839 of the
E.E.A. makes clear that the theft of business or financial information
(including perhaps some types of insider trading) falls within the ambit of
the statute.2 6 Second, the E.E.A. extends the definition of trade secrets to
20 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, Comment b (1939).
21 Risch, supra note 14, at 8.
22 Jeff Danley, Cadence v. Avant!: The U. T.S.A. and California Trade Secret Law, 19
BERKELEY TECH L.J. 289, 291 (2004).
23 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2006).
24 Thierry Olivier Desmet, The Economic Espionage Act of 1996: Are We Finally
Taking Corporate Spies Seriously?, 22 HOUSTON J. INT'L 93, 114 (1999).
25 18 U.S.C. § 1839 (2006).
26 One class of insider trading cases involves persons outside the corporate organization
(such as printers working for those engaged in mergers or acquisitions) who take
information and trade on it. See Carpenter v. U.S., 484 U.S. 19 (1987); See Sec. & Exch.
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involve information in any form "whether tangible or intangible, and
whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically,
electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing."2 7  This
language suggests that not only information stored in electronic form but
also data stored in a person's memory can be the subject of trade secret
piracy. 28 For example, in Allen v. Johar, Inc.,29 the defendant worked for
Johar, Inc. as a sales manager. Johar was in the business of grinding
extruded rubber into handgrips for sporting equipment, motorcycles, and
tools. After working for Johar for nine years, Allen developed two grinding
machines, allowing him to compete with Johar, 30 and then contacted ten of
Johar's customers.3 1 Allen obtained the customer information based on his
memory. In holding that the customer list is a trade secret, the Arkansas
Supreme Court found that it is immaterial if the customer information
involved was written down or memorized. 32 Also, in Stampede Tool
Warehouse v. May,33 an Illinois appellate court found that the customer list
of a national distributor of auto tools is a trade secret. The court determined
that a trade secret can be misappropriated by both physical copying and/or
memorization. 34 Third, the E.E.A. modifies the provision in the definition
of "secret" regarding the relevant public whose knowledge is tested and
changes the relevant person to "the public." 35 However, the question under
the U.T.S.A is whether one's competitors actually knew or could easily
discover the secret.
Trade secrets are both similar to and different from patents,
copyrights, and trademarks in various ways. "Unlike a patent, [trade secret]
information need not be unique, novel, or non-obvious to be protected. In
fact, trade secret information need not even be original, allowing for the
protection of such items as names and phone numbers that would not be
protected under copyright." 36  Moreover, two or more parties who
independently discover the same valuable information may both be entitled
Comm'n v. Material, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984); see generally J.H.A. Pooley, M. Lemley
& P. Toren, Understanding the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
177 (1997).
27 18 U.S.C. § 1839 (3) (2006).
28 Pooley et al., supra note 26, at 189.
29 823 S.W.2d 824, 825 (Ark. 1992).
30 Id. at 825.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 827.
33 651 N.E.2d 209, 218 (111. App. Ct. 1995).
34 Id. at 217.
35 Pooley et al., supra note 26, at 191.
36 Risch, supra note 14, at 12.
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to trade secret protection. 37 "Trade secrets resemble the patent requirement
for usefulness and the trademark requirement for actual use because they
must possess some independent economic value by being unknown to
others." 38 Trademarks must possess actual value while trade secrets (under
the U.T.S.A.) need only have potential value. 39 Further, unlike a copyright,
a trade secret does not have to be registered before a plaintiff commences a
lawsuit.40 Moreover, a trade secret does not have to be based on a new idea
to qualify for legal protection.
4 1
As can be seen, a trade secret can be any tangible property or
intangible information so long as the owner has taken reasonable measures
to keep such property or information secret and the information derives
independent economic value from not being generally known, as discussed
below.
4 2
Ill. REASONABLE EFFORTS TO PROTECT A TRADE SECRET
The owner of a potential trade secret must take reasonable measures to
protect it. The U.T.S.A. requires that the trade secret be "the subject of
efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its
secrecy." 43 Reasonable secrecy, not absolute secrecy, is required, because:
Without [such] a rule... the amount spent by owners and takers
would escalate without any corresponding social benefit. This is
why absolute secrecy is not required; the cost of achieving
absolute secrecy will often be so high that the value of the secret
is spent on ensuring that there can be no possible accidental
disclosure without any corresponding social benefit.
44
37 Id.; see Michelle Armond, Comment, Introducing the Defense of Independent
Invention to Motions for Preliminary Injunctions in Patent Infringement Lawsuits, 91 CALIF.
L. REV. 117 (2003); See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 178
(7th Cir. 1991); Cadence Design Sys. Inc. v. Avant. Corp., 57 P.3d 647, 650-51 (Cal. 2002).
38 Risch, supra note 14, at 12; see also The Lanham Act § I (a), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)
(2006) (establishing trademark requirements for actual use).
39 Risch, supra note 14, at 12-13.
40 17 U.S.C. § 411 (2006).
41 Jon Chally, The Law of Trade Secrets: Toward a More Efficient Approach, 57 VAND.
L. REV. 1269, 1281 (2004); DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 116 Cal. App. 4th 241, 251
(Ct. App. 2004).
42 Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Trade Secrets-The New Risks Posed to Trade Secrets
Posed by Computerization, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH L.J. 227, 237 (2002).
43 U.T.S.A. § 1(4)(ii) (2009).
44 Risch, supra note 14, at 43; see Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights on the Frontier:
How the Law Responds to Self-Help, I J. L. ECON. & POL'Y. 215, 232 (2005).
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Reasonable measures may be placed in two categories. The first
category includes physical methods such as limited access, self-closing and
self-locking doors, electrified fences, and guard dogs, and also includes
virtual methods such as computer passwords, encryption, and hibernation
defaults, and personnel techniques such as background checks and
employee seminars. 4 5 The second category involves precautions where
secrecy is enhanced by information control. Such methods include the
dissemination of information on a "need-to-know" basis, rules that restrict
copying of sensitive documents, and rules that proprietary information
should be stored in a fragmented manner.
46
"Reasonable efforts" are a significant component in ascertaining the
availability of trade secret protection for the following reasons: the amount
of effort corresponds to the value of the secret; (2) the protection is only
accorded to things that would not be voluntarily or accidentally disclosed;
and (3) protective effort provides evidentiary support to indicate that the
information was in fact maintained as a secret, and hence, that the
defendant secured the secret through improper means.
47
With regard to the first reason, the amount and cost of protective
measures required "should be roughly proportional to the value of the secret
to prospective appropriators." 48 A prospective appropriator will expend
effort to gain a competitor's information based upon its value. Hence, the
value of the information to its owner and appropriator will determine the
amount of protection required. 49 Next, trade secret law balances protection
of proprietary business data against disclosure of information beneficial to
consumers. 50 The balance struck by trade secret law is that only the most
costly or evil means of unmasking a secret are prohibited.5' Third,
reasonable measures taken to guard proprietary information serves as proof
that such information is, in fact, a trade secret. Without protective
measures, a business may not be able to prove that information is secret
because it would more likely be exposed to the public. 52 Further, security
45 Rodgers & Marrs, supra note 9, at 26- 27.
46 Id. at 26.
47 Jermaine S. Grubbs, Give the Little Guys Equal Opportunity at Trade Secret
Protection: Why the "Reasonable Efforts" Taken by Small Business Should Be Analyzed
Less Stringently, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 421, 423 (2005).
48 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 357 (The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 2003).
49 Grubbs, supra note 47, at 426.
50 Id.
51 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 48, at 364.
52 Grubbs, supra note 47, at 427; U.T.S.A. § 1(4)(ii).
[Vol 7:1
IMPORTANCE OF TRADE SECRET LA WS
measures indicate to all parties that the business is willing to protect its
information.
Some courts and commentators consider measures to protect trade
secrets the most important factor in the determination of whether a trade
secret exists. 53 For example, in Secure Services Technology, Inc. (SST) v.
Time and Space Processing, Inc. (TSP),54 the plaintiff SST sold TEMPEST
fax machines to American NATO agencies and qualified private
government contractors. Defendant TSP decided to enter the TEMPEST fax
machine market which meant that TSP's machines had to send and receive
documents from other TEMPEST machines. 55  TSP achieved
interoperability only after the federal government provided the company
with an SST fax machine. 56 Plaintiff SST claimed that the fax handshake
protocol was a trade secret. The district court disagreed ruled against SST,
finding that the handshake protocol was not a trade secret. The district court
noted that the contract for the sale of the fax machines by SST did not
reserve any proprietary interest in its machines. 57 In addition, contract
provisions did not exist which prohibited the government from supplying
the SST fax machines to third parties.58 Further, neither the fax machine
nor the operator's manual contained any restrictive or proprietary legends
or any copyright notices. 59  In granting the defendant's motion for
summary judgment, the district court noted that SST waived trade secret
protection by its failure to protect the protocol variations.
60
Therefore, a claimant must establish the substantive steps taken to
maintain the secrecy of the information that is allegedly a trade secret. The
determination of what steps are reasonable under any given set of
circumstances is a question of fact.61 The secrecy of the information must
be maintained in perpetuity by definition; and the claimant will lose trade
53 Junkunc v. S.J. Advanced Tech. & Mfg. Corp., 498 N.E.2d 1179, 1183 (111. App. Ct.
1986) (the extent of measures that the trade secret claimant takes to guard the secrecy of the
information is determinative of whether it is a trade secret); Chally, supra note 41, at 1284.
54 See Secure Servs. Tech. Inc. V. Time and Space Processing, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 1354,
1357 (E.D. Va. 1989).
55 Id.
56 Id. at 1359.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 See Secure Servs. Tech. Inc. v. Time and Space Processing, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 1354,
(E.D. Va. 1989).
60 Id. at 1360.
61 Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 666 (4th Cir. 1993) (secrecy is a
question of fact); see Injection Research H Specialists, Inc. v. Polaris Indus., L.P., 168 F.3d
1320 (Fed. Cir. Colo. 1998).
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secret protection the moment of its dissemination. 62  Courts assess the
totality of the circumstances in order to ascertain whether the measures
taken to protect the secrecy of an alleged trade secret were reasonable63 and
often require measures "rigorous enough to force another to use improper
means to discover the information."
64
Factors that a court considers in the evaluation of reasonable measures
to protect secrecy include, but are not limited to, the following:
the existence or absence of a confidential disclosure or non-
competition agreement [sic]; (2) the nature and extent
of... precautions taken to prevent acquisition of the information
by unauthorized third parties; (3) the circumstances under which
the information was disclosed...; (4) the degree to which the
information has been placed in the public domain...; and (5)
how prevalent trade theft is in the industry.
65
Many businesses, including small firms, make frequent use of
confidential disclosure and non-competition agreements in order to protect
its secrets. A confidential disclosure agreement is an important step in
protecting trade secrets against disclosure by employees, independent
contractors, suppliers, customers, and other third parties. Companies
usually disclose confidential information to their employees who have a
need to know, however wider dissemination outside the employment
relationship (without a confidential disclosure agreement) may defeat a
trade secret claim.
66
In general, an employee stands in a confidential relationship with his
employer with regard to the employer's trade secrets.67 "The nature of the
employment relationship imposes a duty on employees and former
62 See Continental Data Systems, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 638 F. Supp. 432, 442-43 (E.D.
Pa. 1986).
63 Grubbs, supra note 47, at 427; Secure Services Tech., 722 F.Supp. at 1360-61.
64 Grubbs, supra note 47, at 427.
65 Picker Int'l. Corp. v. Imaging Equip. Servs. Inc., 931 F. Supp. 18, 23 (D. Mass. 1995)
(quoting Kubik, Inc. v. Hull, 224 N.W.2d 80, 91 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974).
66 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 584 (1985); Smith v. Snap-
On Tools Corp., 833 F.2d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1987); see generally Fin. Tech. Int'l., Inc. v.
Smith, 247 F. Supp. 2d 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (involving a clause in a consulting agreement
prohibiting defendant independent contractor from disclosing or using for its own purposes
any of plaintiff's information which has commercial value in its business and which was not
in the public domain).
67 Elizabeth Rowe, When Trade Secrets Became Shackles: Fairness and the Inevitable
Disclosure Doctrine, 7 TUL. J. TEcH. & INTELL. PROP. 167, 167 (2005).
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employees not to use or disclose the employer's trade secrets. '68 The
employer can fortify its claim with regard to employees and trade secrets,
however, by advising employees of the existence of trade secrets and
limiting their access to the information on a need-to-know basis. 69 "The
courts have been clear that this protection applies to an employer's trade
secrets even after the employee no longer works for the employer.,
70
There is a limited exception to this general rule that applies to those
who have not signed an agreement not to compete. An employee who has
not signed such an agreement is free upon leaving employment to engage in
competitive employment. 7 1 Upon leaving employment, a former employee
may use general knowledge, skills, and experience acquired under his or
her former employer. 72 As one court has noted:
Our society is extremely mobile and our free economy is based
upon competition; one who has worked in a particular field
cannot be compelled to erase from his mind all of the general
skills, knowledge, and expertise acquired through his experience
... Restraints cannot be lightly placed upon an employee's right
to compete in the arena of his greatest worth.73
An employer can increase the likelihood of success in a trade secret
case against a former employee by using both confidentiality/non-
disclosure agreements and non-compete contracts. Various court decisions
"recognize the employer's need for such agreements to promote investment,
protect innovation, and promote free competition." 74  A standard
68 Ed Nowogroski Ins., Inc. v. Rucker, 971 P.2d 936, 943 (Wash. 1999).
69 Cf U.S. v. Lange, 312 F.3d 263, 266 (7th Cir. 2002) (ruling that keeping all drawings
and manufacturing data in a room protected by a special lock, alarm system, and motion
detector were reasonable secrecy measures).
70 Rowe, supra note 67, at 186; see also Air Prod's. & Chems., Inc. v. Johnson, 215
U.S.P.Q. 547, 552 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (a former employer can reasonably rely upon the
obligation of its employees not to disclose trade secrets about which they obtained
knowledge while working in an employment relationship).
71 See Nowogroski, 971 P.2d at 941; Canteen Vending Servs. v. Mfrs. & Traders Trust
Co., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7589, at *5-6 (W.D.N.Y. May 15, 1998) (acknowledging that
absent an express agreement or misappropriation of trade secrets, an employee may compete
with his former employer after the end of the employment relationship).
72 Cummings v. Dickson, No. EV 88-191-C, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17121, at *13 (S.D.
Ind. July 27, 1989) ("Although an employer is entitled to protect proprietary interests, she is
not entitled to an employee's use of her knowledge, skill, or general information acquired or
increased through experience.").
73 Bendinger v. Marshalltown Trowel Co., 994 S.W.2d 468, 475 (Ark. 1999) (emphasis
& citation omitted) (citing AMP, Inc. v. Fleischhaker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1202 (7th Cir. 1987)).
74 Rowe, supra note 67, at 188; see Ticor Title Ins. v. Cohen, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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nondisclosure or confidentiality agreement states that the employment
arrangement creates a relationship of trust with regard to confidential
information such as trade secrets, inventions, customer and supplier lists,
etc. "Confidentiality agreements are helpful for (1) delineating the
confidentiality expectations between employer and employee; (2) showing
that the employer takes trade secret protection seriously; and (3)
demonstrating the employer's reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy of its
confidential information." 75 Non-compete agreements bar employees from
working for competitors or establishing a competing business after leaving
an employer. In the majority of states, non-compete agreement
enforceability depends on the satisfaction of various criteria. Such
agreements: (1) must not be any broader than necessary to protect the
employer's business interests; (2) may not impose undue hardships on the
employee; and (3) may not be burdensome to the public interest.7
6
However, nondisclosure/non-compete agreements are effective only if
employees understand their legal obligations for the protection of trade
secrets.
77
In some states, courts deter the disclosure of trade secrets by former
employees through the application of the doctrine of inevitable disclosure.
This doctrine "seeks to restrict the transfer of proprietary information
through placing limitations on the subsequent professional activities of
employees." 78 The inevitable disclosure doctrine permits courts to prohibit
employees from working in other entities where the utilization of trade
secrets could harm their former employer's competitive position.79 In most
cases, application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine requires the
existence of a signed non-compete agreement. 80 Only on rare occasions
will a court enforce the doctrine in the absence of a non-compete
agreement.81 From a public policy standpoint, the inevitable disclosure
9700, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); see Applied Micro, Inc. v. SJI Fulfillment, Inc., 941 F. Supp.
750, 757-58 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
75 Rowe, supra note 67, at 189; Stephen Sheinfeld & Jennifer Chow, Protective
Employer Secrets and the "Doctrine of Inevitable Disclosure, " 600 PRACTISING L. INST.
LITIG. 367, 389 (1999).
76 See BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 93 N.Y.2d 382 (1999).
77 FINK, supra note 15, at 231-232.
78 Fitzpatrick et al., supra note 2, at 62.
79 Id.
80 Rowe, supra note 67, at 209.
81 One of those rare occasions occurred in PepsiCo., Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1271 (7th
Cir. 1995). In that case, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a preliminary
injunction against William Redmond, Jr., a former employee of PepsiCo., to prevent him
from divulging trade secrets in his new job with Quaker Co. The injunction also prevented
Redmond from temporarily going to work for Quaker. Redmond had signed a confidentiality
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doctrine requires a court to balance the right of the employer to protect its
trade secrets with the right of the employee to earn a living.
82
Courts also consider the nature and extent of precautions taken to
prevent acquisition of information by unauthorized third parties. Still, no
single step taken to maintain the secrecy of information will be
determinative. If the claimant can establish a consistent approach to
keeping information secret it will go a long way toward establishing
reasonable precautions. These security measures include the following:
advising employees that certain organizational information,
processes, and/or technologies have been assigned a trade secret
designation; (2) limiting trade secret access to those persons with
a legitimate need to know; (3) requiring persons with access to
trade secrets to sign confidentiality agreements; (4) installing a
variety of electro-mechanical and other physical security devices
(e.g., locked cabinets, safes, alarms, electronic sensors, security
personnel, etc.); (5) conspicuously marking proprietary
information as confidential; and (6) developing corporate
security policies which screen external speeches and publications
by organizational personnel for the disclosure of trade secrets or
proprietary information.
8 3
agreement but not a non-compete agreement. In support of granting a preliminary injunction
without a non-compete agreement, the Circuit Court cited Redmond's specialized
knowledge of PepsiCo's trade secrets, the fierce competition in the sport drink industry and
lack of trust in Redmond. Some legal commentators expressed concern that this decision
would lead to a windfall for employers who could benefit from ex post facto non-compete
agreements without having negotiated them and prevent affected individuals from earning a
livelihood. Matthew Miller, Note, Inevitable Disclosure Where No Non-Competition
Agreement Exists: Additional Guidance Needed, 6 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 9, 39-40 (2000).
This has not occurred because most courts require the existence of a legal non-compete
agreement to issue an injunction. See Minn. Mining & Mfg. v. Francavilla, 191 F. Supp. 2d
270, 274-75, 282 (D. Conn. 2002); Lumex, Inc. v. Highsmith, 919 F. Supp. 624, 632-34
(E.D.N.Y. 1996).
82 FMC Corp. v. Cyprus Foote Mineral, 899 F. Supp. 1477, 1484 (N.C. 1995).
83 Fitzpatrick et al., supra note 2, at 58. In Religious Technology Center, v. NetCom On-
Line Communication Services, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1995), plaintiff sued
defendant Dennis Erlich for posting trade secrets of the Church of Scientology on the
Internet. Erlich, a former minister of the Church of Scientology, had access to various
Scientology writings including published literary works and unpublished confidential
materials. According to the plaintiff, Erlich had agreed to maintain the confidentiality of
various materials (referred to as Advanced Technology works). Plaintiff argued that Erlich
misappropriated trade secrets which had been the subject of elaborate security measures.
Protective steps included use of locked cabinets, safes, logging and identification of the
materials, availability of the materials at only a handful of global sites, electronic sensors
attached to documents, locked briefcases for transporting works, alarms, photo
identification, and security personnel. The district court granted a preliminary injunction
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Another factor that courts evaluate in an assessment of measures to
protect secrecy is the circumstances under which the information was
disclosed. Trade secret law protects the trade secret holder only if the
information at issue has been obtained from the holder by means that the
law deems inappropriate. Most organizational trade secrets are
compromised because of the negligence or dishonesty of people.8 4 One
team of researchers reports that about half of those surveyed viewed as
appropriate the collection of competitive intelligence through hiring away
key employees of competitors, posing as prospective customers, and
entertaining the employees of competitors to secure trade secrets. 85 In
another study, a researcher documents that about fifty percent of group
members showed no moral qualms in utilizing trade secrets to achieve a
competitive advantage.
8 6
Generally, a trade secret plaintiff must demonstrate misappropriation,
therefore, no presumption is made against the defendant. 87  In Vermont
Microsystems, Inc. v. Autodesk, Inc.,88 an ex-employee kept certain trade
secrets of his employer after cessation of employment while acting as a
consulting engineer independently on a software project that closely
resembled the trade secrets of Vermont Microsystems (VM). Even though
he failed to incorporate those secrets into the project, 89 the ex-employee
admitted that he developed the software using VM's trade secrets. 90 VM
was able to satisfy its burden of proof because of the ex-employee's
admission. 9 1  In general, many courts protect against trade secret
misappropriation by any means deemed improper.
9 2
An additional factor relevant to an assessment of trade secret
protection measures is the degree to which the information has been placed
against defendant concluding that the security precautions were more than reasonable.
84 Fitzpatrick et al., supra note 2, at 59.
85 B. GILAD & T. GILAD, THE BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM: A TOOL FOR
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE (1988).
86 See W. Schwartau, Cyber Ethics in the Workplace, NETWORK WORLD, Jan. 21, 2002,
available at http://www.networkworld.com/columnists/2002/0121 schwartau.html.
87 Scott Kline & Mathew Floyd, Managing Confidential Relationships in Intellectual
Property Transactions: Use Restrictions, Residual Knowledge Clauses, and Trade Secrets,
25 THE REV. LITIG. 311 (2006).
88 See Vermont Microsystems, Inc. V. Autodesk, Inc., 88 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 1996).
89 Id. at 144.
90 Id. at 145-46.
91 Id. at 146.
92 Ruchelhaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 & n. 9 (1984); E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1014-15 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 400
U.S. 1024 (1971).
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in the public domain or rendered readily ascertainable by third parties. This
factor does not address one's ability to access or obtain the trade secret
from the holder but the likelihood that the proprietary information may be
readily ascertainable from a publicly available source. For example, in
Sethscot Collection Inc. v. Drbu193 an intermediate appellate court held that
a retailer's active list of customers compiled from customers who had done
business with the retailer and was not available to the public, was a
protected trade secret. In Picker International Corp. v. Imaging Equipment
Services, Inc.,94 a federal district court found diagnostic software
information to be a trade secret because plaintiff did not publicly disclose
such data by publishing papers, giving lectures, or providing proprietary
information in government reports. In Alan Scott, D.C., P.A. v. Moses,95 a
chiropractor's patient list was deemed not to be a trade secret because the
chiropractor failed to demonstrate that such list could not be obtained by
other means. Also, in Leo Publications, Inc. v. Reid,96 a newspaper's list of
advertising clients was ruled not to be a trade secret because the data on the
list was "readily ascertainable" through the use of proper methods and
published sources.
IV. INDEPENDENT ECONOMIC VALUE
A trade secret requires proof of "independent economic value, actual
or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic
value from its disclosure or use." 97 To be valuable, a trade secret must
have value not only to its owner, but commercial value to competitors or
others who might benefit from its use. 98 Under U.T.S.A., "the definition of
trade secret does not require that there currently be competitors, only that
there be actual or potential value from information being secret. Thus,
potential competition is sufficient."
99
Competitors will seek the most valuable trade secrets which grant the
original innovator the most extensive monopoly rights. The exclusive
93 Sethscot Collection, Inc. v. Drbul, 669 So.2d 1076, 1078 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
94 Picker Int'l Corp. v. Imaging Equip. Servs., 931 F. Supp. 18, 22-23 (D. Mass. 1995).
95 Scott v. Moses, 712 So.2d 1242, 1243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
96 458 S.E.2d 651, 652 (Ga. 1995).
97 U.T.S.A. § 1(4)(i) (1985).
98 See Diamond v. T. Rowe Price Assocs., 852 F. Supp. 372, 412 (D. Md. 1994); see
also A. M. Skier Agency, Inc. v. Gold, 2000 PA Super. 53, 15, 747 A.2d 936, 940
(demanding a show of value to provide protection of information as a trade secret).
99 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. NetCom On-Line Commc'n Servs., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1253
(N.D. Cal. 1995).
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knowledge of a trade secret controlled by the initial innovator may allow
that innovator to earn economic rents (i.e., excess profits). Such rents attract
competitors and new market entrants to obtain the trade secret from which
the innovator profits. 00 If trade secrets did not possess economic value,
"then remedies such as injunctions would impose an unjustified social cost
by limiting potentially valuable information ... from those who could use
it." 101
The economic value the claimant must establish is objective in
nature-not subjective-so the claimant is incompetent to offer any
testimony on the issue.10 2 The plaintiff must submit expert testimony on
this point (most likely a forensic accountant who is a business valuation
expert). 10 3 The expert witness must show that the value of the information
is derived from the fact that it is not generally known and not readily
ascertainable.' 0 4 Persuasive evidence of not being generally known could
come from a competitor or expert in the market who testifies that the
information is not generally known.1
0 5
The U.T.S.A. does not prescribe the amount of independent economic
value information must possess to be considered a trade secret. The court
has ruled that the value need not be great. 10 6 The U.T.S.A. speaks only to
"economic" value, any value which is not economic and cannot be
quantified is not a component of economic value. 10 7 Hence, a claimant
must focus less on the amount of value and more on the "kind" of value to
which the U.T.S.A. speaks.
10 8
100 Chally, supra note 41, at 1280-8 1.
101 Riscb, supra note 14, at 38.
102 Gaffney & Ellison, supra note 12, at 13.
103 The expert witness should be qualified under the applicable rules of evidence as a
business valuation expert. The individual should possess significant knowledge and
experience in the specific industry in which the information finds its competitive advantage.
The expert's opinion should be supported by substantial evidence in the form of receipts,
income statements, market analyses, and other financial projections. Id, at n.36.
104 All Pro Sports Camp, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 727 So. 2d 363, 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1999). The phrase "not readily ascertainable" means the trade secret claimant must
establish that the information could not have been discovered by proper means. This issue is
addressed infra in the section on misappropriation. Information which is commonly known
within a given industry or market and not considered to be unique to the claimant will most
likely be considered "generally known." Id.
105 Bestechnologies, Inc. v. Trident Envtl. Sys., Inc., 681 So. 2d 1175, 1175 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1996).
106 SeeTelerate Systems, Inc. v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating
that even a slight competitive edge will satisfy the economic value requirement).
107 Gaffney & Ellison, supra note 12, at 16.
108 Id at 17. U.T.S.A. mandates that the information sought to be protected is not known
to and is "not readily ascertainable" by those who might use the information for competitive
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Trade secret value can be determined using three approaches: the
market approach, the cost approach, and the income approach. The market
approach is the most difficult to use in the valuation of a trade secret. The
method involves the comparison of the sale of similar assets to what is
being valued. As a trade secret is unique, finding a comparable asset is
quite difficult. The cost method is better suited to the valuation of a trade
secret. This technique factors in items such as the cost of replacement. It is
important to know how long and how much money it took to create the
trade secret. The income approach considers anticipated revenues and
future economic benefits to be derived from the trade secret. Using
reasonable economic models, this technique is preferable to the market
approach. 109
V. MISAPPROPRIATION OF A TRADE SECRET
The U.T.S.A. establishes a statutory cause of action for two different
types of misappropriation-one for wrongful acquisition and a second for
wrongful disclosure. The first is defined by the U.T.S.A. as the "acquisition
of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know
that the secret was acquired by improper means. ''hO Misappropriation by
wrongful disclosure is:
[D]isclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express
or implied consent by a person who (A) used improper means to
acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or (B) at the time of
disclosure or use knew or had reason to know that his knowledge
of the trade secret was (1) derived from or through a person who
has utilized improper means to acquire it: ... III
"Thus, a plaintiff can state a claim for misappropriation simply by
demonstrating that the defendant acquired its trade secret by improper
means, even if the plaintiff cannot show use of that trade secret." 12
A. Wrongful Acquisition
Wrongful acquisition under the U.T.S.A. requires the plaintiff to
demonstrate that (1) the defendant acquired the trade secret; and (2) he or
she knew, or had reason to know, that the information was acquired through
advantage.
109 FINK, supra note 15.
110 U.T.S.A. § 1(2)(i) (1985).
111 U.T.S.A. § 1(2)(ii).
112 Systems 4, Inc. v. Landis & Gyr, Inc., 8 F. App'x 196, at *200 (4th Cir. 2001).
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"improper means." 1 3 Under the U.T.S.A., "improper means includes theft,
bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to
maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means." 114
Improper methods or means "constitute intentional conduct involving some
sort of stealth, deception or trickery."' 15 In many cases, "improper' means
includes acts that are actionable in and of themselves-trespass, breach of
contract, conversion of physical property, and ... the misuse of computer
networks." 116 One court has held that improper means includes obtaining
"knowledge of a process without spending the time and money to discover
it independently.., unless the holder voluntarily discloses it or fails to take
reasonable precautions to ensure its secrecy."' 17
The U.T.S.A.'s list of "improper means" is not exhaustive and
includes a catchall for espionage. The Restatement states that "improper
means" are those that fall below the generally accepted standards of
commercial morality and reasonable conduct.1 18 The jury must determine
improper means under a particular set of facts. 
1 19
The fluidity of the concept of "improper means" is illustrated by the
question of whether dumpster diving-surreptitiously searching through the
trash of another to discover trade secrets-constitutes improper means. The
means may be improper when conversion or trespass occurs but what about
discarded trash that has been removed from the owner's property? In
Tennant Co. v. Advance Machine Co., 120 a state appellate court held that an
owner of trash retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents
until it becomes mixed with trash elsewhere. However, in Frank W. Winne
113 U.T.S.A. § 1(2)(i).
114 U.T.S.A. § I(]).
115 Systems, 8 F. App'x at 200.
116 Physicians Interactive v. Lathian Sys., Inc., 69 U.S.P.Q. 2d (3NA) 1981, 1988 (E.D.
Va. 2003); Risch, supra note 14, at 10.
117 E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., Inc. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015-16 (5th Cir.
1970).
118 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, Comment f at 10 (1939). Comment I to
section 1 of the U.T.S.A. contains a partial listing of proper means:
1. Discovery by independent invention;
2. Discovery by "reverse engineering", that is, by starting with the known product
and working backward to find the method by which it was developed;
3. Discovery under a license from the owner of the trade secret;
4. Observation of the item in public use or on public display; and
5. Obtaining the trade secret from published literature.
119 DSC Commc'ns Corp. v. Pulse Commc'ns, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
120 355 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
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and Son, Inc. v. Palmer, 121 a federal court ruled that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in trash set out for collection.
Most trade secret misappropriation claims involving wrongful
acquisition have been asserted "either against a defendant who had a
confidential relationship with the trade secret owner or against a former
employee who becomes hired by a competitor." 122 Such cases involve a
claim that the defendant breached a duty of secrecy or confidentiality. An
employee's "duty ... not to disclose the secrets of his employer may arise
either from an express contract, or may be implied from the confidential
relationship existing between employer and employee" and an employee
may not use this information to the detriment of the employer. 1
23
The trade secret claimant must demonstrate that the saboteurs were
made aware that the information was secret and not to be divulged. For
example, in Tedder Boat Ramp Systems, Inc. v. Hillsborough County, 124 a
federal court held that by clearly marking information given to the
defendant as "confidential" the latter was made aware that the information
was not to be disclosed. Also, in Aries Information Systems, Inc. v. Pacific
Management Systems Corp., 125 the Minnesota Supreme Court found that by
reading and signing confidentiality agreements that employees knew they
were under a duty to maintain secrecy of trade secret data.
The E.E.A. provides a more detailed list than the U.T.S.A. of acts
deemed to involve wrongful acquisition. The E.E.A. sanctions one who
"steals, or without authorization, appropriates, takes, carries away, or
conceals, or by fraud, artifice or deception obtains [a trade secret].'
126
Also, whenever one knowingly "receives, buys, or possesses such
information, knowing the same to have been stolen or appropriated,
obtained, or converted without authorization," he has illegally acquired the
trade secret. 
127
B. Wrongful Use or Disclosure
Wrongful use or disclosure of a trade secret under the U.T.S.A. is
somewhat more complex than wrongful acquisition. The claimant must
121 No. 91-2239, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11183, *11 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 1991).
122 Kurt M. Saunders, Can You Keep a (Trade) Secret?-The Pennsylvania Uniform
Trade Secrets Act, 75 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 139, 146 (2004).
123 BIEC Int'l, Inc. v. Global Steel Servs., 791 F. Supp. 489, 548 (E.D. Pa. 1992); See
also Flotec, Inc. v. S. Research, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 992, 999 (S.D. Ind. 1998).
124 54 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1305 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
125 366 N.W.2d 366, 369 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
126 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(1)(2006).
127 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(3).
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establish that the defendant actually used the trade secret or disclosed the
information to another.128 The U.T.S.A. does not define the terms "use" or
"disclosure" nor does the U.T.S.A. appear to require a certain level of
activity to impose liability. Once the claimant establishes that the trade
secret saboteur did not consent to use or disclose the trade secret he or she
must establish that the defendant (1) used improper means to acquire
knowledge of the trade secret; (2) knew or had reason to know that the trade
secret had been obtained from one who used improper means (or breached a
duty of confidentiality); 129 or (3) used or disclosed accidentally acquired
information and knew or had reason to know it was a trade secret.130 The
U.T.S.A. does appear to create a safe harbor for defendants who
accidentally obtain trade secret information but neither know nor have
reason to know of its protected status or how it was acquired illicitly.
Also, any person who obtains trade secret knowledge in a confidential
capacity is under an obligation not to reveal the secret or use it for his or her
own advantage. 13 1 Third parties may be held liable if they induced another
to misappropriate a trade secret or knowingly or negligently acquired a
trade secret from or through one who had acquired or revealed it
illegally. 132
The E.E.A. defines wrongful use or acquisition more broadly than the
U.T.S.A. The E.E.A. punishes one who "without authorization copies,
duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs, downloads, uploads, alters,
destroys, photocopies, replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails,
communicates, or conveys a trade secret."' 133 The inclusion of transmitting
and delivering will permit legal action against one who merely discloses the
secret without using it.
The E.E.A.'s description of stealing and unauthorized copying of
128 Liability may not arise from every "use" of a trade secret. In some cases, the use must
affect a party's competitive market position. Omnitech Int'l, Inc. v. Clorox Co., II F.3d
1316, 1325 (5th Cir. 1994).
129 The U.T.S.A. provides that the claimant must show that "at the time of disclosure or
use, [the defendant] knew or had reason to know that his or her knowledge of the trade secret
was: (a) derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means to acquire it; (b)
acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
(c) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to
maintain its secrecy or limit its use." U.T.S.A. § I (2)(ii)(B) (1985).
130 Gaffney & Ellison, supra note 12, at 32.
131 Healthcare Affiliated Servs., Inc. v. Lippany, 701 F .Supp. 1142 (W.D. Pa. 1988)
(employment agreement whereby defendant agreed to preserve the confidentiality of
employer's techniques).
132 Saunders, supra note 122, at 147.
'33 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831 (a), 1832 (a)(2) (2006).
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trade secrets covers all types of new and future technologies. 134  The
federal trade secret statute "makes it a crime to deprive the rightful owner
of trade secrets in any way, as long as this creates an economic benefit for
the thief or a third party. This ... indicates that the thief or third party need
not gain a direct benefit from the information as long as he gains a relative
benefit by depriving the rightful owner of the information."
135
E.E.A. language is not limited to secrets obtained by improper means.
Even legally acquired trade secrets can be misappropriated under the E.E.A.
because it serves as an incentive against waste. 136 The E.E.A. discourages
wasteful behavior and motivates the internalization of options by
sanctioning punishment despite the use of legal alternatives to discover
trade secrets. 
13 7
One troublesome aspect of the E.E.A. is how it treats reverse
engineering. While reverse engineering is not expressly prohibited under
the E.E.A., it is not expressly permitted. 138  Some types of reverse
engineering, such as observing or tasting a lawfully acquired product to
determine its contents, are not prohibited by the E.E.A. 139 The legality of
reverse engineering under the E.E.A. appears to be a function of whether
the actor engages in any acts outlawed under the statute.
C. Espionage Techniques
Tools used in the perpetration of trade secret espionage include but are
not limited to scanning trade show floors, combing through websites,
eavesdropping in airline terminals and on airline flights, reviewing filings
with regulatory agencies, taking photographs of factories and businesses,
using data-mining software to search databases on the internet, 140 stealing
laptop computers, 141 dumpster diving, 142 and application of the MICES
134 Michael Coblenz, intellectual Property Crimes, 9 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 235, 292
(1999).
135 Id. at 292-93. Harm to the original owner is important in the E.E.A., not just benefit to
the thief. The issue is what the owner has lost and not only what the taker has gained. Id.
136 Risch, supra note 14, at 51.
137 Id.
138 Pooley et al., supra note 26, at 195.
139 See Mason v. Jack Daniel Distillery, 518 So. 2d 130 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987) (rejecting
a claim that the defendant reverse engineered an alcoholic beverage by tasting it).
140 Neil King, Jr. & Jess Bravin, Call It Mission Impossible Inc.-Corporate Spying
Firms Thrive, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2000, at B I.
'41 Nick Wingfield, A Stolen Laptop Can Be Trouble if Owner is CEO, WALL ST. J., Sept.
19, 2000, at B 1.
142 Harry Wingo, Dumpster Diving and the Ethical Blindspot of Trade Secret Law, 16
YALE L. & POL'Y. REV. 195, 196 (1997).
Winter 2009]
BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LA WJOURNAL
principle. 143
MICES is an acronym describing agent recruitment methodologies
based on money, ideology, compromise, ego, and sexual entrapment.
144
Money is often employed to enlist the assistance of employees in illicitly
obtaining the trade secrets of firms. Individuals who are under severe
financial strain are offered bribes to reveal trade secrets. 145  The theft of
trade secrets related to the Kodak 401 filmmaking process illustrates this
espionage technique. 146  The ideology aspect of MICES is applied to
encourage individuals to turn over employer trade secrets due to loyalty to a
foreign nationality or philosophical values that differ from those of the
employer. 147  Compromise techniques extort employees into betraying
trade secrets by threatening to disclose personally or professionally
damaging information. 148  Ego techniques try to isolate employees
possessing low- or bruised self-esteem or a disgruntled attitude to yield
proprietary information 149  Lastly, sexual entrapment is employed to
generate photographs, video recordings or sound tapes that can compel
employees to disclose trade secrets through threats of blackmail or
extortion.150  The application of the MICES principle costs American
143 William M. Fitzpatrick & Donald R. Burke, Virtual Organizations: Competitive
Intelligence Vulnerabilities and the Corporate Security Dilemma, I J. GLOBAL CoMP. 82
(2001).
144 Fitzpatrick et al., supra note 2, at 59.
145 Id.; FINK, supra note 15, at 265-70.
146 The 401 process was a research and development program to enhance the speed and
quality of film-making at Kodak. One Kodak employee, Harold Worden, possessed
knowledge of the whole manufacturing process, anticipated early retirement, and had
authority to recommend what aspects of the 401 technology would be patented. Before
retirement, Worden used his position to secretly acquire documents outlining details of the
401 process. After departing Kodak, he sold the 401 process technology to Kodak
competitors. Worden was apprehended in an FBI sting operation. In 1997, he pled guilty to
selling trade secrets to Kodak officials who were working undercover, posing as Chinese
agents. Having agreed to cooperate in a continuing investigation, he was able to negotiate a
plea bargain that resulted in a one-year prison sentence and a $30,000 fine. Desmet, supra
note 24, at 99; Fitzpatrick et al., supra note 2, at 59-60.
147 Fitzpatrick & Burke, supra note 143, at 85-6.
148 Id.; see HUGO CORNWALL, THE INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE HANDBOOK (Century 1991).
149 Fitzpatrick et al., supra note 2, at 60. A noteworthy instance involving this facet of
MICES principle is United States v. Martin, 228 F.3d I (Ist Cir. 2000). In that case, Caryn
Camp, an employee of IDEXX, Inc., stole trade secrets related to veterinary diagnostic kits.
She was a disgruntled employee (eager to find a new job). In her job search, she commenced
e-mail correspondence with Dr. Stephen Martin. The latter was CEO of WDV, a competitor
of IDEXX. Martin reinforced Camp's damaged ego by discussing job opportunities, the
nature of her discoveries, and general corporate gossip about IDEXX. She eventually
disclosed through e-mail proprietary information, software, and computer files containing
IDEXX trade secrets.
I50 Fitzpatrick et al., supra note 2, at 61.
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businesses large sums of money each year.
VI. AVAILABLE REMEDIES
A. Damages
A successful trade secret claimant under the U.T.S.A. is entitled to
recover damages from a misappropriation. Damages can include both the
actual loss caused by the misappropriation 15 1 and unjust enrichment that is
not considered in computing actual loss. 15 2 Punitive or exemplary damages
may be awarded in some circumstances. 15 3 "Recovery of actual damages is
proper only for the period in which the information is entitled to trade
secret protection, plus any additional period during which the defendant has
a competitive advantage . . . ,,154 An examination of authority from across
the U.S. indicates that the proper method of computation is on the basis of
net profit, whether lost by the injured party or gained by the wrongdoer. 1
55
The trade secret claimant is entitled to that which affords greater relief.1
56
A party seeking damages must supply a reasonable basis for the
computation of those damages. 1
57
The U.T.S.A. also permits recovery for unjust enrichment or the
misappropriated profits, as long as the amounts are in addition to the trade
secret owner's fees.158 Plaintiffs have been permitted to seek an accounting
of the profits made by the defendant because of the wrongful appropriation
151 Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 411 P.2d 921, 942 (Cal. 1966) (direct evidence of
causation required in trade secret actions or damages); Frantz v. Johnson, 999 P.2d 351, 359
(Nev. 2000) (permitting circumstantial evidence of causation).
152 U.T.S.A. § 3(a) (1985); Jennifer L. Saulino, Locating Inevitable Disclosure's Place in
Trade Secret Analysis, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1184, 1190 (2002).
153 If the claimant can establish that the misappropriation was willful or malicious, the
court may award punitive or exemplary damages. "Willful and malicious" has been defined
as conduct necessary to sustain a conviction for manslaughter or actual malice. Perdue
Farms Inc. v. Hook, 777 So. 2d 1047, 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
154 Saunders, supra note 122, at 150.
155 See Roton Barrier, Inc. v. Stanley Works, 79 F.3d 1112 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Brown v.
Ruallam Enter., Inc., 44 S.W.3d 740, 745 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001).
156 Brown, 44 S.W.3d at 744.
'57 Levy v. Markal Sales Corp., 643 N.E.2d 1206 (111. App. Ct. 1994).
158 U.T.S.A § 3, Comment (amended 1985). The remedy of awarding profits discourages
potential invaders from avoiding the bargaining process and invading the resource without
first obtaining the holder's consent. "Profits are aimed to fit most closely the goal of
vindicating the holder's control, by making it worthless for the invader to take the holder's
entitlement. This implies that, when a defendant is faced with the possibility of disgorging
all his profits if he invades the plaintiff's resource, he should effect a transfer instead by
obtaining the plaintiffs ex ante consent." James W. Hill, Trade Secrets, Unjust Enrichment,
and the Classification of Obligations, 4 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2, 10-11 (1999).
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of the trade secret and then recover such profits. 159 Recovery of the
misappropriator's profits (or prevention of unjust enrichment) reduces the
competitor's incentive to focus more resources on appropriation. The
importance of preventing unjust enrichment trade secret cases is aptly
reasoned as follows:
If the competitor values the trade secret in an amount more than
the owner will lose or if the court undervalues the amount of the
trade secret owner's loss, then the competitor will have an
incentive to spend more on appropriation. In turn, this will cause
the owner to spend more on protection than it otherwise might
need to if it had the remedy, leading to the same "arms race"
without a commensurate gain in expected social value.
160
If the facts of a case are insufficiently precise to justify a damage
award based upon lost profits or unjust enrichment, then courts prefer to use
the "reasonable royalty theory" for a defendant's unauthorized disclosure or
use of a trade secret. 16 1 "A reasonable royalty award tries to measure a
hypothetically agreed upon value of what the defendant wrongfully
obtained from the plaintiff."' 162 The court computes what the parties would
have agreed to as a fair licensing price at the time the misappropriation
occurred. 163 "[M]ost courts adjust the measure of damages to accord with
the commercial setting of the injury, the likely future consequences of the
misappropriation, and the nature and extent of the use the defendant put the
trade secret to after misappropriation." 164
A court may also award "exemplary damages" under the U.T.S.A.
where the misappropriation is "willful and malicious." The amount may
not exceed twice the amount of any award for actual loss or unjust
enrichment. 165 One example of "willful and malicious" behavior occurred
in Smith v. Snyder. 166 In Snyder, former employees of Lectron Corporation
covertly started a competing business, used fraudulent means to
misappropriate the plaintiffs' most productive and efficient machine,
discouraged the plaintiffs' existing customers by overquoting jobs,
159 Rohm and Haas Co. v. Adco Chem. Co., 689 F.2d 424, 433-34 (3d Cir. 1982).
160 Risch, supra note 14, at 59.
161 Kline & Floyd, supra note 87, at 339-41.
162 Vermont Microsystems, Inc. v. Autodesk, Inc., 88 F.3d 142, 151 (2d Cir. 1996).
163 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 446 F.2d 295, 296-97
(2d Cir. 1971).
164 Univ. Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 538 (5th Cir. 1974).
165 Gaffney & Ellison, supra note 12, at 33.
166 839 A.2d 589 (Conn. 2004).
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disrupted the plaintiffs' cash flow by not sending out bills, and solicited the
plaintiffs' customers and diverted them to their own business venture.
167
However, the defendants did not dispute the trial court's finding that their
conduct was willful and malicious, resulting in punitive damages being
awarded. Another example of such conduct transpired in Boeing Co. v.
Sierracin Corp.168  In that case, the trial court found that "Sierracin
misappropriated Boeing's drawings for replacement cockpit windows for
Boeing 707s, 727s, and 737s. 169 The trial court record indicated that
Sierracin knew its actions to be of dubious legality and engaged in a
massive effort to disguise its copying of Boeing's drawings."' 170 The
appellate court ruled that the evidence justified the imposition of punitive
damages.
B. Injunctive Relief
The U.T.S.A. authorizes a court to issue an injunction to prohibit an
actual or threatened misappropriation of a trade secret. 17 1  The usual
standards for injunctive relief apply to trade secret situations. The trade
secret claimant must show: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2)
irreparable injury; (3) such injury outweighs any harm to the defendant; and
(4) the injunction would not harm the public interest. 172 The first factor is
often considered the most important. 173 The trade secret claimant may
prove a likelihood of success on the merits by establishing the existence of
a trade secret and by making a prima facie case that the defendant
misappropriated that trade secret. 174  The second element is usually
automatically satisfied because the loss of a trade secret is generally found
to constitute irreparable harm. 175 Also, the claimant must convince the
court that the harm it will incur will outweigh any harm to the defendant if
it is granted and show how the "public interest" will be served by the
167 Id. at 593.
168 738 P.2d 665 (Wash. 1987).
169 Id. at 670.
170 Id. at680.
171 U.T.S.A. § 2(a) (1985).
172 Touchpoint Solutions, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 345 F. Supp. 2d 23, 27 (D. Mass.
2004).
173 Ice Cold Auto Air v. Cold Air & Access, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 925, 930 (M.D. Fla. 1993)
(request for injunction in trade secret action properly denied because claimant failed to
establish likelihood of success on the merits).
174 Arminius Schleifminel GmbH v. Design Indus., Inc., No. 1:06CV00644, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10847, at *3 (M.D.N.C. 2007).
175 Computer Ass'ns. Int'l v. Quest Software, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 2d 688, 700 (N.D. Ill.
2004).
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court's exercise of its equitable powers.' 76  One "public interest"
consideration cited by some courts is the need to enforce contracts, such as
non-disclosure agreements and non-compete clauses. 
177
A court may issue an injunction to prohibit an actual or threatened
misappropriation of a trade secret. 178 The injunction should be in place for
only "as long as is necessary . . . to eliminate the commercial advantage or
'lead time' with respect to good faith competitors that a person has obtained
through misappropriation" and "should terminate when a former trade
secret becomes either generally known to good faith competitors or
generally knowable to them because of the lawful availability of products
that can be reverse engineered to reveal a trade secret." 179 Under
"exceptional circumstances," the court may condition future use of the trade
secret on payment of a reasonable royalty for the time period during which
the defendant's use could have been prohibited. 18°  Under appropriate
circumstances, a court may order that affinnative acts be undertaken to
protect the trade secret. 18 1 However, a court must terminate an injunction
upon a showing that the trade secret no longer exists "but it may be
continued for a 'reasonable period of time' to eliminate any commercial
advantage which may have been derived from the misappropriation."
182
A court may also enjoin threatened misappropriation of a trade secret.
The U.T.S.A. does not define the term "threatened misappropriation" so it
is not clear what conduct or circumstances would justify an injunction
under such language. In some courts, the existence of a real and present
danger of disclosure is enough. 183 Mere suspicion of injury is not sufficient
to constitute an actionable threat.184 The possibility of disclosure does not,
by itself, rise to the level of inevitability of disclosure. 18 5 In sum, "the
176 Am. Red Cross v. Palm Beach Blood Bank, Inc., 143 F.3d 1407, 1410 (11th Cir.
1998); Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1342 (11 th Cir. 1994).
177 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Ran, 67 F. Supp. 2d 764, 781 (E.D.
Mich. 1999).
178 U.T.S.A. § 2(a) (1985).
179 U.T.S.A. § 2 Comment.
180 U.T.S.A. § 2(b).
181 U.T.S.A. § 2(c); See also Phillips v. Corporate Express Office Prods., Inc., 800 So. 2d
618, 621 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
182 Gaffney & Ellison, supra note 12, at 34.
183 See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1457 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (granting
injunction with showing of threat of misappropriation); La Calhene, Inc. v. Spolyar, 938 F.
Supp. 523, 531 (W.D. Wisc. 1996) (granting injunction where there was threat of
disclosure).
184 Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 941 F. Supp. 98, 101 (D. Minn. 1992).
185 See FMC Corp. v. Cyprus Foote Mineral Co., 899 F. Supp. 1477, 1481 (W.D.N.C.
1995) (explaining that the "mere possibility of misappropriation" is insufficient grounds for
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exact nature and duration of an [injunction] must be tailored to fit the facts
of the case and that an injunction should generally be only as broad as is
necessary to protect the rights of the plaintiff."'
186
VII. DEFENSES TO LIABILITY
One of the most popular defenses includes challenges to the trade
secret plaintiff's substantive elements of proof. 187  Each one of the
substantive facts that the claimant offers to satisfy the elements of the
U.T.S.A. should be carefully assessed, and, if required, rebuttal evidence
proffered.' 88 The trade secret defendant should pursue factual weaknesses
in any facet of the claimant's case, especially the areas of value, secrecy,
and accessibility. 1
89
Other defenses are also available. A trade secret misappropriator may
avoid liability by demonstrating that the same information (as the trade
secret) could have been derived by independent discovery or reverse
engineering.190 Others besides the trade secret claimant are free to obtain
the same data as the trade secret and use it so long as they gain their
knowledge through independent efforts. 19 1  "Reverse engineering is a
method of industrial engineering in which one begins with a known
finished product and works backward to divine the processes and
specifications involved in the product's development and manufacture."
1 92
It also may involve "looking at or tasting a lawfully acquired product in
order to determine its content."' 19 3  Independent discovery involves the
creation or discovery of a trade secret as a result of one's own effort. 
19 4
Another defense for the alleged trade secret misappropriator is the
statute of limitations. Actions for trade secret misappropriation must be
brought within three years "after the misappropriation is discovered or by
the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been discovered."' 19 5 One
injunctive relief).
186 Abreu v. Unica Indus. Sales, Inc., 586 N.E.2d 661, 672 (111. Ct. App. 1991) (citations
omitted).
187 Gaffney & Ellison, supra note 12, at 37.
188 Id. at 38.
189 Id.
190 Henry Hope X-Ray Prods., Inc. v. Marron Carrel, Inc., 674 F.2d 1336, 1341 (9th Cir.
1982).
191 Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F. Supp. 806, 812 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
192 Rockwell Graphics Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 914, 917 n.3 (7th Cir.
1996).
193 Pooley et al., supra note 26, at 195.
194 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
'95 U.T.S.A. § 6 (1985).; See also Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 523-24 (9th
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thorny issue here is whether or not an ongoing misappropriation constitutes
a continuing wrong or a single claim. This issue is important because it
either triggers the statute of limitations period or tolls the statute of
limitations as long as the misappropriation continues. The U.T.S.A. states
that a continuing misappropriation constitutes a single claim. 196 Among
U.T.S.A. jurisdictions, a conflict of authority exists as to whether
misappropriation is a continuing wrong.1
9 7
The U.T.S.A. also provides an exception to the right to sue for
damages for trade secret misappropriation. A trade secret claimant is not
entitled to damages if the defendant demonstrates that (1) it made a material
and prejudicial change in its position prior to acquiring knowledge of the
misappropriation, which has (2) rendered monetary relief inequitable. 
19 8
VIII. INTERNAL CONTROLS TO PROTECT TRADE SECRETS
The key steps in the protection of trade secrets are to identify
company information that may constitute a trade secret and to implement
reasonable controls to ensure this information is kept confidential. 199
"Within a very wide band of discretion, the trade secret owner must have
considered the value of the secret, the nature of the threat to disclosure, and
the cost of any particular security mechanism." 20 0  The avoidance of
significant expenditures on physical controls or security is consistent with
the goal of encouraging investment in trade secret research. 20 1
The most effective way to prevent trade secret fraud and show
"reasonable efforts" is to implement a comprehensive trade secret
compliance plan. Such a program should be designed for the specific
organization and the actual risks it faces. The various factors that should be
considered in its design are: (1) the size of the company (the larger the
entity, the more formal the plan); (2) the risks inherent in the business; (3)
past history of either security problems or trade secret piracy; and (4) any
applicable industry or government standards related to information security.
Such a compliance plan includes numerous elements.
Cir. 1990).
196 U.T.S.A. § 6.
197 Saunders, supra note 122, at 148.
198 U.T.S.A. § 3(a) (1985).
199 Carl Pacini & Richard Brody, A Proactive Approach to Combating Fraud, 62
INTERNAL AUDITOR 56, 59 (2005).
200 Pooley et al., supra note 26, at 217.
201 Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991).
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A. Physical Restrictions
"First, trade secrets should be kept in restricted areas. For instance,
confidential processes, devices, or information can be performed or kept in
sectioned-off or locked areas or receptacles to which only appropriate
personnel have access. '"202 Physical restrictions include restricted access to
premises (key cards, receptionists, building security), file cabinet locks,
trash security (to prevent dumpster diving), surveillance equipment, control
of prototypes, and control of writings and presentations by scientists and
others. 20 3 An entity should consider using "employee/visitor identification
badges, "DO NOT ENTER" or "RESTRICTED ACCESS" signs for
confidential areas, simple sign in/out sheets," computer passwords, physical
barriers, and policies to keep visitors away from trade secret information.
20 4
An entity should consider the use of unnamed or coded components or
ingredients. For example, in Mangren Research & Development Corp. v.
National Chemical Co.,20 5 the court found that removing supplier labels
from ingredients used to manufacture a product and replacing said labels
with company-coded labels were sufficient for establishing reasonable
protection efforts. The method used by KFC Corporation to protect its
secret recipe fried chicken seasoning is to have one supplier provide one
part of the recipe and another vendor supply the other with neither having
knowledge of the ingredients supplied by the other.
206
B. Employee Restrictions and Monitoring
An employer should address trade secret protection issues from the
moment a prospective employee applies for a job and should conduct
criminal background checks on prospective employees. From the start,
prospective employees should know what is required of them, such as a
high degree of responsibility in maintaining the confidentiality of specified
information. If potentially damaging information must be revealed during
the job interview process, the applicant should sign a pre-employment
confidentiality agreement.
Once hired, the employee should be informed of the trade secrets that
202 John Halan, Protecting Trade Secrets: Steps Every Trade Secret Owner Should Know,
30 EMP. REL. L.J. 22, 23 (2004).
203 Morton v. Rogers, 514 P.2d 752, 754 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973) (blending directions and
formulae kept locked up with only limited employee access upheld as trade secrets); See
Dicks v. Jensen, 768 A.2d 1279, 1285 (Vt. 2001) (customer list which was not locked and
was available to any employee held not a trade secret).
204 Rodgers & Marrs, supra note 9, at 27.
205 87 F.3d 937, 943 (7th Cir. 1996).
206 KFC Corp. v. Marion-Kay Co., 620 F. Supp. 1160, 1163 (S.D. Ind. 1985).
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he or she is bound to protect. He or she should be asked to sign a non-
disclosure or non-compete agreement, which often includes various
confidentiality provisions. Upon starting work, the employee should be
monitored for compliance with the rules regarding trade secrets, especially
those involving computer usage and telecommunications. 20 7 This type of
monitoring can be implemented through the installation of keystroke
logging software/hardware and/or packet sniffers on computer
systems/networks. "Keystroke logging software/hardware creates
encrypted log files that store a record of the keystroke or typing activities of
a computer user. These files are stored in a manner invisible to the
computer user .... An example of these monitoring technologies is the Spy
Agent software package."
20 8
The education of employees on the confidential nature of trade secrets
is another important aspect of a trade secret compliance plan. Employees
should be informed about their duties to guard trade secrets and the
consequences of failing to do so. The viability of many businesses is tied
directly to the protection of trade secrets. For example, employees should
be taught not to discuss confidential information "in the presence of third
parties, such as in elevators, at restaurants, at the airport, and in personal
emails." 20 9 In addition, employees should be taught to discern between
general information and sensitive data that should not be disclosed to
unauthorized persons.
An exit interview should be conducted before an employee departs a
firm. The purposes of such an interview are to identify compromises in
security perceived by the departing employee and stress that proprietary
information must not be disclosed. Also, legal forms should be signed by
the departing employee acknowledging her understanding of the firm's
trade secret policies, and the continuing obligation of non-disclosure. In
some cases, the new employer should be notified in writing of the
employee's obligation not to disclose or use trade secrets. "Such
precautions will make it difficult, if not impossible, for the employee to
later claim that he or she had no reason to know that such was a trade secret
or acquired by improper means."
2 10
207 Heidi v. Anderson, Know Your Privacy Rights, COMPUTER PRIVACY & SEC., Apr.
2002, at 101, 101.
208 Fitzpatrick et al., supra note 2, at 66-67.
209 Rodgers & Marrs, supra note 9, at 26.
210 Halan, supra note 202, at 26. Accord Hexcomb Corp. v. GTW Enters., Inc., 875 F.
Supp. 457, 467 (N.D. 111. 1993) (finding that defendant knew of the trade secret status of a
machine because he had been put on notice of such during exit interviews).
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C. Other Miscellaneous Controls
An entity should conduct systematic audits or inventories of its trade
secret portfolio. As noted, trade secrets may include formulas, prototypes,
processes, customer lists, analytical information, marketing campaigns and
strategies, scientific notebooks, computations, chemicals, equations, cost
information, quality control procedures, revenue information, budgets and
forecasts, and other internal data or information. It is incumbent upon
management to learn what information gives the firm a competitive
advantage.
Firms should enter agreements with suppliers, consultants,
independent contractors, vendors, and others to protect all types of
proprietary information. Often such agreements include both a pledge to
refrain from using the company's trade secrets and also a promise not to
compete. Refusal of a third party to enter into an agreement vital to the
protection of trade secrets raises a serious question about whether the
company should be doing business with that entity. A company owning
trade secrets must protect them during any negotiations with third parties
including prospective customers and those interested in buying products,
technology, or other company assets.
Another critical dimension of a firm's trade secret compliance plan is
document protection, retention, and destruction. Scientific and technical
information should be in notebook form and "confidential" identification
should be stamped on documents. Moreover, documents should not be
copied without control-an inventory should be kept of all copies,
identifying their location. Special permission should be required to remove
documents from the premises and should be granted only for compelling
reasons. Also, documents and other items containing trade secret
information should be labeled with legends or stamps denoting such to be
proprietary trade secret data.2 11 Documents should be discarded only after
supervising or legal personnel have been consulted. Discarded documents
should be destroyed by burning, shredding, or other means of destruction.
IX. CONCLUSION
Trade secret espionage activities are conducted by current and former
employees, competitors, foreign governments, independent contractors,
211 See Picker Int'l Corp. v. Imaging Equip. Servs., Inc., 931 F. Supp. 18, 36 (D. Mass.
1995) (diagnostic software upheld as trade secret where proprietary legends were used on
copies and, on later versions, were viewed on computer screens in conjunction with a
lockout mechanism).
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vendors, business intelligence analysts, and others. The information sought
out in trade secret fraud activities includes customer lists, pricing strategies,
formulas, compilations, financial information, processes, design manuals,
strategic and marketing plans, and other proprietary information.
The primary means of civil enforcement available to victims of trade
secret espionage is a lawsuit filed under the U.T.S.A. or state trade secret
common law. In a civil suit, a trade secret claimant must prove the
following elements: (1) the existence of a trade secret; (2) reasonable steps
to preserve secrecy; (3) independent economic value of the trade secret; (4)
misappropriation; and (5) actual damage.
The Restatement, U.T.S.A., and the E.E.A. can be used to determine if
a trade secret exists. The Restatement provides a narrower definition than
the U.T.S.A. because it focuses upon business processes and practices.
Under the E.E.A., the list of potential types of trade secrets is more
expansive than under the U.T.S.A. The U.T.S.A. establishes statutory
causes of action for both wrongful acquisition and wrongful disclosure of a
trade secret. Wrongful acquisition means that the information was acquired
through improper means. Improper means includes numerous illegal acts
and obtaining knowledge of a process without spending the time and money
to discover it independently. For wrongful disclosure, the claimant must
establish that the defendant actually used the trade secret or disclosed the
information to another.
The owner of a trade secret must take reasonable measures to protect
it. Such measures include physical methods and the fragmentation of
infonnation. Some courts consider means to protect trade secrets the most
important factor in the determination of the existence of a trade secret. The
issue of what steps are reasonable under a particular set of circumstances is
a question of fact.
A trade secret claim also requires proof of independent economic
value. The trade secret claimant must demonstrate that competitors or
others attach value to the trade secret. Competitive value communicates to
the courts that the legal protection for trade secrets is justified. The value of
protected information is derived from the fact that it is not generally known
and not readily ascertainable. Economic value can be determined using the
cost, market, and/or income approaches.
A successful trade secret plaintiff may recover damages from and/or
obtain an injunction against an offender. Damages can include both actual
losses (computed on the basis of net profit) and unjust enrichment not
considered in actual losses. If the facts are not precise enough to warrant a
damage award based upon lost profits or unjust enrichment then courts use
the "reasonable royalty theory." Exemplary damages may also be awarded
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where the misappropriation is willful and malicious. An injunction may be
issued to prevent an actual or threatened trade secret misappropriation.
One of the main defenses to liability under the U.T.S.A. is challenges
to the claimant's evidence for each of the required statutory elements. A
trade secret misappropriator may also negate liability by proof that the
secret could have been derived by independent discovery or reverse
engineering. The statute of limitations is also an acceptable defense to trade
secret misappropriation.
Finally, the most effective way to prevent trade secret fraud is to
implement a trade secret compliance plan. The elements of such a
compliance program include physical restrictions, employee restrictions and
monitoring, systematic audits or inventories of trade secrets, agreements
with suppliers, consultants, independent contractors, vendors, and others,
and document protection, retention, and destruction.

